WikiLeakS.org, are still "on strike", awaiting more financial donations, but they do continue to publish a few headline grabbing "leaks", without the full wiki system which used to allow readers to analyse and comment on them on the website itself.
They are claiming that:
U.S. Intelligence planned to destroy WikiLeaks
We cannot see much evidence of any actual "plan", only a statement of the obvious, that if US Military whistleblowers are tracked down and disciplined or prosecuted, this may have a deterrent effect on future leaks, in general and to Wikileaks in particular.
WikiLeakS.org point out that none of that has happened, as yet, in the couple of years since this intelligence report was compiled.
There is mention of foreign i.e. non-USA potential Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) and / or Computer Network Attacks (CNA) on wikileaks, but with no mention of any US military capabilities or policies in these areas.
This document appears to be:
(U) Wikileaks.org--An Online Reference to Foreign Intelligence Services, Insurgents, or Terrorist Groups?
Information Cutoff Date: 28 February 2008
Publication Date: 18 March 2008
Michael D. Horvath
Cyber Counterintelligence Assessments Branch
Army Counterintelligence Center
External Coordination: National Ground Intelligence Center
This product responds to HQ, Department of Army, production requirement C764-97-0005.
ACIC Product Identification Number is RB08-0617.
(U) This special report assesses the counterintelligence threat posed to the US Army by the Wikileaks.org Web site.
Julian Assange, one of the main WikiLeakS.org activists, uses this paragraph (marked as Secret / Not for Foreigners), at the end of the Executive Summary on page 3 of 32 (also as the start of the Conclusions on page 21 of 32) , to make the "claim that "U.S.Intelligence planned to destroy WikiLeaks"
(S//NF) Wikileaks.org uses trust as a center of gravity by assuring insiders, leakers, and whistleblowers who pass information to Wikileaks.org personnel or who post information to the Web site that they will remain anonymous. The identification, exposure, or termination of employment of or legal actions against current or former insiders, leakers, or whistleblowers could damage or destroy this center of gravity and deter others from using Wikileaks.org to make such information public.
All of that also applies to most other organisations or companies, whose confidential documents end up on WikiLeakS.org, not just those belonging to the US Army.
This one paragraph out of a 32 page report does not seem to be any sort of "plan", just a statement of the obvious.
(S/NF) stands for "Secret / Not for Foreigners", a marking which is used on many of the paragraphs in this report, which also contains (U) unclassified paragraphs as well.
Interestingly Julian does not mention this paragraph (pages 5 and 6):
(S//NF) The obscurification technology used by Wikileaks.org has exploitable vulnerabilities. Organizations with properly trained cyber technicians, the proper equipment, and the proper technical software could most likely conduct computer network exploitation (CNE) operations or use cyber tradecraft to obtain access to Wikileaks.org's Web site, information systems, or networks that may assist in identifying those persons supplying the data and the means by which they transmitted the data to Wikileaks.org. Forensic analysis of DoD unclassified and classified networks may reveal the location of the information systems used to download the leaked documents. The metadata, MD5 hash marks, and other unique identifying information within digital documents may assist in identifying the parties responsible for leaking the information. In addition, patterns involving the types of leaked information, classification levels of the leaked information, development of psychological profiles, and inadvertent attribution of an insider through poor OPSEC could also assist in the identification of insiders.
Reference  is :
 (U) Obscurification technology: the science of obscuring or hiding objects and information.
The report carefully does not say that United States military, intelligence or law enforcement organisations could or should be involved in "computer network exploitation (CNE) operations or use cyber tradecraft" using these old vulnerabilities in, for example, Tor , instead suggesting that it could be Foreign organisations (FISS = Foreign Intelligence and Security Services) instead (page ):
(U) The OPSEC measures used in the submission of leaked information to Wikileaks using the Internet are designed to protect the identity and personal security of the persons or entities sending or posting information to the Web site. Wikileaks.org claims that any attempt at trace routing of IP addresses, MAC addresses, and other identifying information of a home computer submissions (as opposed to cyber café submissions) through Wikileaks.org's Internet submission system would require a knowledge of information available only to Wikileaks.org programmers and to a rights organization serving the electronic community, or would require specialized ubiquitous traffic analysis of Internet messages and routing systems. Nevertheless, it remains technically feasible for FISS, law enforcement organizations, and foreign businesses that have the motivation, intentions, capability, and opportunity to gain online access or physical access to Wikileaks.org information systems to identify and trace whistleblowers through cyber investigations, advanced cyber tools, and forensics.
 (U) School of Computer Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. ―Internet
Geolocation and Evasion.‖ URL: http://cs.smu.ca/~jamuir/papers/TR-06-05.pdf. Accessed 5
(U) Geocities. ―Exposing Tor Users' IPs‖ URL:
http//uk.geocities.com/osin1941/exposingtor.html. Accessed on 28 December 2007.
(U) Secunia. ―Multiple Security Vulnerabilities for Tor.‖ CVE-2006-3407, CVE-2006-3408, CVE-2006-3409, CVE-2006-3410, CVE-2006-0414, CVE-2006-3165, CVE-2006-4508, CVE-2007-4096, CVE-2007-4097, CVE-2007-4098, CVE-2007-4099, CVE-2007-4174, CVE-2007-4508, CVE-2007-4099. URL: http://archives.seul.org. Accessed on 8 January 2008.
This WikiLeak.org blog has written about the "Peryton" whistleblower code name, which is specifically discussed in the US military intelligence report:
Does linking "Peryton" to several leaks partially betray the WikiLeakS.org promise of anonymity ? (February 13, 2008 2:11 AM)
It is worth repeating the Questions raised in the Intelligence Gaps section of this document (pages 20 and 21)
(U) Intelligence Gaps
- (S//NF) What individual persons or entities are leaking DoD sensitive or classified information to Wikileaks.org, and are they working on behalf of a foreign agent or power? What are the reasons, intentions, and motivations of the current or former insider?
- (S//NF) Is the potential insider leaking the information to Wikileaks.org a former employee of the US government or a mole still working for the US government? How is the insider sending digital information to Wikileaks.org? What cyber or other tradecraft is the perpetrator using?
- (S//NF) Will the Wikileaks.org Web site be used by FISS, foreign military services, foreign insurgents, or terrorist groups to collect sensitive or classified US Army information posted to the Wikileaks.org Web site?
- (S//NF) Will the Wikileaks.org Web site be used by FISS, foreign military services, or foreign terrorist groups to spread propaganda, misinformation, or disinformation or to conduct perception or influence operations to discredit the US Army?
- (S//NF) Will the Wikileaks.org Web site be used for operational or cyber tradecraft to pass information to or from foreign entities?
- (S/NF) Will the Wikileaks.org Web site developers obtain new software for Web site development, management, security, encryption of messages or files, or posting anonymous information to the Web site?
- (S//NF) Will foreign entities attempt to conduct CNE or CNA to obtain information on the posters of information or block content on the Wikileaks.org Web site?
- (S//NF) What software, tactics, techniques, and procedures would be used by a foreign actor to conduct CNE or CNA against the Web site?
CNE = computer network exploitation
CNA = computer network attack
- (S//NF) Will foreign persons, businesses, or countries attempt civil lawsuits or criminally prosecute whistleblowers, Wikileaks.org staff, and members who posted comments on the Web site?
- (S//NF) Will Wikileaks.org and various users expand the data fields in the TOE SQL
database to include equipment capabilities, equipment limitations and vulnerabilities, known unit locations, links to geospatial information services, or known unit personnel to
develop ―battle books for targeting packages?
- (S//NF) What other leaked DoD sensitive or classified information has been obtained by Wikileaks.org?
- (S//NF) Will foreign organizations such as FISS, foreign military services, foreign insurgents, or terrorist groups provide funding or material support to Wikileaks.org?
It is interesting that this SECRET / NOFORN (NOFORN = Not releasable to Foreign Nationals, equivalent to "UK Eyes Only") document cites this Spy Blog article 3 times cited 3 times as references [39, 40 and 41]
(U) Spy Blog. ―Is Wikileaks.org the Right Idea for a Whistleblowing Website? 5 January 2007.
URL: http://firstname.lastname@example.org/blog/2007/01/is_wikileaks.org_the_right_idea_for_a_ whistleblowing_website/html. Moved from URL: www.spy.org.uk/spyblog. Accessed on 17 December 2007.
This URL has got mangled somewhat, so interested readers should go to:
Spy Blog, January 5, 2007 2:09 PM:
Is WikiLeaks.org the right idea for a whistleblowing website ?
It is worth comparing the "Intelligence Gaps" questions with the original Spy Blog questions about the whole WikiLeakS.org project, which are cited 3 times as a reference [39, 40 and 41]
Perhaps "U.S. Intelligence planned to destroy WikiLeaks", but this leaked document does not provide hard evidence of that rather sensational claim.
The intelligence report rightly pays respect to the technical work involving SQL database cross referencing of the Iraq war equipment register by WikileakS.org activists and others. The September 11th 2001 pager messages project was also impressive.
However the intelligence report is not sceptical enough about some of the unproven claims made by WikiLeakS.org e.g. where exactly are the more than a million leaked Chinese documents ? They were not available via the wiki, when it was running.
Similarly, the claim to use PGP encryption to protect whistleblowers is false and the "easy to use" encryption software for CDs and DVDs sent via postal mail, has also never materialised.
Any future revision of this intelligence report on WikiLeakS.org should perhaps look at how the core activists are not actually content with waiting for other people to send them "Leaked" documents,, but are actively trying to create new documents etc. which have never been "leaked" by anyone in the first place.
If the US Army was worried about WIkiLeakS.org a couple of years ago, then some of the recent developments might cause them further anxiety.
See these recent Tweets:
Have encrypted videos of US bomb strikes on civilians http://bit.ly/wlafghan2 we need super computer time http://ljsf.org/
8:10 PM Jan 8th 2010
Finally cracked the encryption to US military video in which journalists, among others, are shot. Thanks to all who donated $/CPUs.
3:18 AM Feb 21st 2010
To whom have they made this allegedly de-crypted video (presumably intercepted from missile carrying drones or other attack aircraft) available ?