WikiLeakS.org is still asking for money:
However, their self imposed moratorium on publishing leaked documents, has now been selectively breached, presumably for political purposes:
Classified cable from US Embassy Reykjavik on Icesave dated 13 Jan 2010
This document, released by WikiLeaks on February 18th 2010 at 19:00 UTC, describes meetings between embassy chief Sam Watson (CDA) and members of the Icelandic government together with British Ambassador Ian Whiting.
This is just a link to a simple text file, rather than the usual WikiLeakS.org wiki page with a (.pdf) or (.zip) archive and a cryptographic checksum.
Publication in this way denies people the opportunity to post Comments on or Analysis of the alleged whistleblower leak document on the WikiLeakS.org website itself.
The actual link is to:
http://wikileaks.org/file/us-watson1-2010.txt
However, the corresponding "secure" SSL / TLS encrypted version of the link is not available:
https://wikileaks.org/file/us-watson1-2010.txt
This re-directs to an Error Page and then to the "secure" document submission web page - why would anyone submit any new whistleblower leak documents to the WikiLeakS.org website, which currently have almost no chance of being published ?
The previously available Tor Hidden service via https://gaddbiwdftapglkq.onion/, which used to offer end to end encryption and quite strong anonymity mixing through the Tor server node cloud, is not working either.
Is this a further erosion of the supposed ethical standards and transparency which were proclaimed when the WikiLeakS.org project started ?
Revealing some alleged details, that Icelandic politicians in the Government and in the Opposition are meeting with each other, and with US and British and Norwegian etc. diplomats, in order to try to find compromises, and a way out of the Icesave financial crisis, is hardly a significant secret, which is being hidden from the Icelandic or world public, for some nefarious reason or other. Surely that is what they are all paid to do as a matter of course, anyway ?
If this plausible looking text is genuine, then will there now be a "mole hunt" / security investigation at the US Embassy in Reykjavik or the State Department and other addresses in Washington, to try to track down how the alleged text of a supposedly confidential and, presumably encrypted, diplomatic telegram fell into the hands of WikiLeakS.org ? Or, since the British Ambassador is named and quoted specifically, and may well have been forwarded a copy, was the leak due to laxness by the United Kingdom's bureaucracy ?
Will all Icelandic staff working at those embassies now fall, unfairly, under suspicion of espionage as a result of this leak ?
Will all internet traffic to and from the WikiLeakS.org website now, be legitimately snooped on by the US National Security Agency ? The NSA is obviously tasked with ensuring the security and confidentiality of US diplomatic cables and other communications to and from US Embassies around the world.
Whether this leak will actually help or hinder the forthcoming vote in the Althing the Icelandic Parliament, on the WikiLeakS.org inspired idea of reforming Icelandic laws to protect investigative journalism and to counter libel tourism and secret legal injunctions etc., is uncertain. See the previous blog article Icelandic Modern Media Initiative - WikiLeakS.org "Publishing Haven" laws in Iceland ?)
Whoever "leaked" this document was savvy enough strip much of the cable header information including the CONFIDENTIAL classification markings that resided at the top and bottom of the actual document/cable. As a former Dept of State communications officer I am displeased that someone with access to this cable made it available in the public domain. But many hundreds of people both in and out of the State Dept had/have access to this cable. The SIPDIS caption alone means that the cable was automatically forwarded to the U.S. govt's SIPRNET, a wide area classified (encrypted) network, not to mention the addressees listed in addition to the State Dept (SECSTATE). ALL my former colleagues in the Dept of State's Information Resource Management bureau would share in my displeasure to see this breech of security; we take our duties of maintaining the Dept's secure communications network VERY seriously. While I cannot speak to the sensitivity of the content of this cable, the fact that all of the content is classified as CONFIDENTIAL should give you pause to make it available on this site. Please do not dismiss the necessity of the U.S. govt to pass classified information to and from the many overseas diplomatic missions. Regards.