Discussion on the lack of a current WikiLeakS.org PGP public encryption key

| | Comments (6)

One of the really annoying "features" of the WikiLeaKs.org system, and of Wikis in general, is the way in which online discussion articles in the Talk pages seem to disappear arbitrarily and without explanation.

If you are a newcomer to such systems, this will present you with a false picture of what is or is not being discussed. Usually, you can delve back through the edit history and find a previous version of what has been deliberately (conspiracy ?) or accidentally (cockup ?) censored or deleted. Because, unlike say Wikipedia, WikiLeaks does allow anonymous editing of the Talk discussion pages (but not yet of the main article pages) it is hard to say if this censorship was deliberate or accidental, or by whom it might have been done.

An example of this is a topic on which this blog has been keeping a watch over, namely the currently expired wikileaks@wikileaks.org PGP encryption key, which expired on 2nd November 2007 last year.

See:

Presumably, the partially relevant, semi-informed discussion on this Slashdot thread Wikileaks Sidesteps Publishing Public PGP Key inspired a new comment to appear (for a while) on the WikiLeakS.org PGP Keys Talk page.

Here is what we were planning to post as a reply, before the comment disappeared or our web browser cache got confused:

Why are you re-inventing the wheel by trying to develop your own "SSL based mail submission system" ?

An SSL-based mail submission system would likely be easier to use for most people and would be just as secure.

Not strictly true. Without extra encryption of the bulk of the messages or the attached document(s) (e.g. by using PGP like, say, Hushmail does) then the email resides as plaintext on the http://88.80.13.160 servers in Stockholm, after the secure SSL (or even Tor) transport. There is then a risk that this could be copied or seized, during the next legal or illegal raid on The Pirate Bay etc. co-location hosting company by the Swedish authorities, or snooped on by the PRQ Internet hosting company staff.

PGP should be one of the tools available to whistleblowers to make use of as required. It is no more difficult to install, and probably easier to use surreptitiously than Tor, which is one of the alternative methods of document submission made available by WikiLeakS.org.

You could send PGP encrypted documents via SSL and / or Tor instead of just plaintext documents.

N.B. the WikiLeakS.org "SSL-based mail submission system" does not yet exist.

Publishing a PGP encryption and signing key is not just about email, it is also useful for some people who might be considering using the postal mail systems to send documents on digital media.


If you are sending material by postal mail I don't think there are many scenarios where it is useful to encrypt it:

1. Material sent to Wikileaks will be publically available, so confidentiality is not an end goal in of itself.

Even though most of a leaked document may be made public, that does not mean that all of them will be, or should be, published as soon as you hit the return key on your keyboard.

Confidentiality is often a temporary, time sensitive requirement in protecting a whistleblower or members of their family and friends e.g. if they are whistleblowing just before they are about to leave a company or government organisation (where they have access to the leaked documents) or they are about to leave a country.

In some cases, a whistleblower gets a certain amount of protection, once their story has achieved widespread publicity and those who might harm their job prospects or lives feel themselves to be under the glare of public scrutiny. Until that point is reached, especially during the period between sending off the leaked information, and having it accepted for publication by WikiLeakS.org (or other mainstream news media or bloggers etc) , however, the whistleblower is vulnerable, or is likely to feel vulnerable, so there is a need for secrecy, even for information which they do intend to make public.

WikiLeakS.org recognise this time sensitive requirement themselves, with their user specified delay and random delayed publication feature. which also tries to confuse Communications Data Traffic Analysis.

2. In most Western countries interception is unlikely if the package is sent in an innocuous manner and they only harmful end result is that the package would not be forwarded, in which case it can be sent again. And since you wouldn't be sending it from your home or business, it is unlikely any interested parties would be doing the interception anyway.

Postal mail and commercial courier packages increasingly get lost or stolen in transit, or delivered to the wrong addressee, even in "advanced" countries, even without any law enforcement or intelligence agency activity whatsoever, simply due to the vast numbers of such items in transit every day.

Why not protect any intermediary friends or couriers (as suggested by WikiLeakS.org themselves) who may be posting mail on your behalf, from whatever you are sending in to WikiLeakS.org by post, by encrypting it with PGP first ?

What if your digital documents e.g. Microsoft Word .docs etc. contain hidden metadata ? You might want to preserve this to help convince the WikiLeakS.org team about the authenticity of the documents. Sending such documents encrypted would reduce the risk of your whistleblower identity from being revealed, before, hopefully, WikiLeakS.org (or indeed, any other mainstream media news organisation) have removed such meta data prior to publication.

3. In locales which do routine interception an encrypted postal package would not be forwarded anyway. Since the same goes for PGP encrypted email.

They almost certainly would be forwarded on, without any unusual delay, because otherwise, the authorities risk "tipping off" the alleged "conspirators", that they are under surveillance, especially if several test or "dry run" encrypted messages are first sent, containing no sensitive or illegal material.

In the United Kingdom, for instance, there are various bits of law from anti-drugs legislation to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 Part III, which provide for criminal penalties of up to 5 years in prison for such "tipping off" offences.

Since SSL is commonplace for commercial transactions it is a more innocuous encrypted transmission medium.

SSL is commonplace, but that does not make it "more innocuous" from a whistleblowing point of view. It is unlikely to be completely blocked by a corporate or government firewall, but SSL does nothing to hide the Communications Traffic Data i.e. your computer's real IP address, the time , date, duration of session, amount of data uploaded and downloaded. to and from the single wikileaks,org target IP address of https://88.80.13.160, which is going to be logged and analysed, whether you use SSL encrypted port 443 https:// on its own or just plaintext port 80 http:// connections.

The use of Tor and other proxy servers in addition to the above, is another matter, with slightly different trust and interception risk issues.

The point about signing releases is probably valid.

If WikiLeakS.org do publish a new PGP key, then it can be used for encryption (confidentiality) of leaked document submissions, as well as for signing (authentication) of press releases etc.

The use of the WikiLeakS.org PGP encryption key by a whistleblower would also allow WikiLeakS.org editors and staff to respond securely and privately back to an anonymous leaker, who could easily generate his or her own PGP key, asking for clarification, or pointing out potentially self incriminating documents etc.

PGP must surely be of use where a whistleblower is supplying a series of leaked documents, rather than just a single one off leak, and wishes to give WikiLeakS.org some advance notice of forthcoming leaks, to allow them to marshal their analytical and media contact resources, on a "confidential journalistic source" basis.

6 Comments

Wikileaks public key shown below. This key has no run out date, is in an RSA key pair format with 4096 bits of assymetric key length..


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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9P8jF1uc1zgebxXzoaFHjRxCsd6+pC4S6snTmPnN6I9c2/g7UngT7VZ7O9t2nBVQ
ZYHK1FpgmY4Zi1mQTWcnciaUkNb+kD6prYFmNZ3Pakt2Q8Bj+kzVp7LTEWJyZ/c9
YgdZT82LnyS+rhQ6eyhQ8Su37Lvpp1HUKDBkBNzEjQsDraxiIRcFus3Whinj35yz
wvTRGDy/Rn7GWFHVQ5uY80scu3MeBGbYYUJTrz6xqN5QpPoe4EFFoJ5P8FboBXUB
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bW4DqlsShWNLvaJaO+A7J+O9hKcY4eVbxbF0zr3Le88azkl2021ofksNPVK8sqBl
eJULXohGBBARAgAGBQJLCbiWAAoJEA0ZX53PFUFnor0AoIfv+uxTqjRMOKEW+63b
Lzx0ylTDAJ9wfYphjOyJ3hRXEdWCQ0WnOVEnirQ/ZGFuaWVsIHNjaG1pdHQgKHdp
a2lsZWFrcyAvIHN1bnNoaW5lcHJlc3MpIDxkYW5zQHdpa2lsZWFrcy5vcmc+iQI2
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s7qFf4yas2qa66eIznrc6rHySREYJxOGXHLxSvssMrvA8YWvaH8kSh+7/lI5IW64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c4qyFBXIBjqT1gSYGpraqxlIFBi0T/J5Xgu9lHEDqfF0CmpysfJ02sM6w/3sUjpZ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=NPjZ
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

@ PGPBOARD - interesting, but does it really belong to:

daniel schmitt (wikileaks / sunshinepress) daniel@wikileaks.org

Fingerprint:B729 9DEC 9FC7 7566 4CBA 788B 491A 31BD 8D07 C962

It does not seem to be on the major PGP Keyservers and it is not published on the WikiLeakS.org website.

This PGP Key is not counter-signed by any others in a "web of trust" / "web of co-conspirators" either.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512


The wikileaks pgp key was requested by PGPBOARD for one of our members. We;
PGPBOARD contacted wikileaks and the key is as received. Upon receipt we
signed the keys with ID Walshingham2000@yahoo.com.

Walsh...


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=Cx5i
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

@ Walsh - still interesting the network of public PGP Keyservers
e.g.

http://pgp.zdv.uni-mainz.de:11371/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=Walshin
gham2000%40yahoo.com&fingerprint=on

does not show the PGP Key ID: 0x4D9BE37A with which which you have
signed your message.

Is your PGP key published anywhere else ?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.3 - not licensed for commercial use: www.pgp.com

iQA/AwUBS8CGbCQzQC0jZ/T3EQJigwCfYZH9FPY8Ve90yJXdO+1GaggPCH8AoPfY
Lkho6JnvEz15c1bpa/EvTxux
=Lv/E
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512


Hello,

Thanks for your reply, you can pick up wikileaks signed key at the url
shown above.

In addition you can pick up PGPBOARD'S PGP/GNUPG public key, and PGP 2.6.2
LEGACY public key.

Walsh..


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

wsDYAwUBS8H/Zo0F20NNm+N6AQqE+AwXdIOjg8QkCHVDG9R6GOq94KaEr4xRE7cI
KIFqOS8taW8G5YoFSIH9oymZTilGW+9VOMT+BI88ItiophtOJb3ZbPC/k1TY/k2W
z6Y/bAZNjPeBePfA3o1d5I4ILC4lLorqgNP1PCX8+H45STtFFs7dtq9qGn7369Y2
lF21eSRh1QHxxV2IV0MqZx/mu45irxmuxx/+Omma22314FQDNI14npDXgJ+V+wPR
esfIs8lSvy93hfLbjRlbqi08OtCAEgnMUyz21u6I2y9/l5vs6DVMytUQkQjQJcdv
e6hR0W0tTAB0pOwMsJob4BQjhUNi+1BeGAidVV18+W3eHE2yHoDuSP9lMtu9G6jQ
K03MjgH+RTBB5zRCZs/ppVShz+nT5DX5RXSXZbBRlKpOd4/67nstG/llz1fYJELI
PY0tewRj3n1gqp5wtWCitqQjnUuX3x0Mtb2LYawDqzDv9EiWGe1eqllneYMGxZbP
0HzLqjiURksuXZ9DczocEiNQ8XduBDxwcejp
=AKLM
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Sorry folk, the URL I mentioned in the last post was not show..

You can pick up the keys here...

http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/pgpboard/

Walsh

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=/Dgm
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

About this blog

This blog here at WikiLeak.org (no "S") discusses the ethical and technical issues raised by the WikiLeakS.org project, which is trying to be a resource for whistleblower leaks, by providing "untraceable mass document leaking and analysis".

These are bold and controversial aims and claims, with both pros and cons, especially for something which crosses international boundaries and legal jurisdictions.

This blog is not part of the WikiLeakS.org project, and there really are no copies of leaked documents or files being mirrored here.

Email Contact

Please feel free to email us your views about this website or news about the issues it tries to comment on:

email: blog@WikiLeak[dot]org

Before you send an email to this address, remember that this blog is independent of the WikiLeakS.org project.

If you have confidential information that you want to share with us, please make use of our PGP public encryption key or an email account based overseas e.g. Hushmail

LeakDirectory.org

Now that the WikiLeakS.org project is defunct, so far as new whistleblower are concerned, what are the alternatives ?

The LeakDirectory.org wiki page lists links and anonymity analyses of some of the many post-wikileaks projects.

There are also links to better funded "official" whistlblowing crime or national security reporting tip off websites or mainstream media websites. These should, in theory, be even better at protecting the anonymity and security of their informants, than wikileaks, but that is not always so.

New whistleblower website operators or new potential whistleblowers should carefully evaluate the best techniques (or common mistakes) from around the world and make their personal risk assessments accordingly.

Hints and Tips for Whistleblowers and Political Dissidents

The WikiLeakS.org Submissions web page provides some methods for sending them leaked documents, with varying degrees of anonymity and security. Anybody planning to do this for real, should also read some of the other guides and advice to political activists and dissidents:

Please take the appropriate precautions if you are planning to blow the whistle on shadowy and powerful people in Government or commerce, and their dubious policies. The mainstream media and bloggers also need to take simple precautions to help preserve the anonymity of their sources e.g. see Spy Blog's Hints and Tips for Whistleblowers - or use this easier to remember link: http://ht4w.co.uk

BlogSafer - wiki with multilingual guides to anonymous blogging

Digital Security & Privacy for Human Rights Defenders manual, by Irish NGO Frontline Defenders.

Everyone’s Guide to By-Passing Internet Censorship for Citizens Worldwide (.pdf - 31 pages), by the Citizenlab at the University of Toronto.

Handbook for Bloggers and Cyber-Dissidents - March 2008 version - (2.2 Mb - 80 pages .pdf) by Reporters Without Borders

Reporters Guide to Covering the Beijing Olympics by Human Rights Watch.

A Practical Security Handbook for Activists and Campaigns (v 2.6) (.doc - 62 pages), by experienced UK direct action political activists

Anonymous Blogging with Wordpress & Tor - useful step by step guide with software configuration screenshots by Ethan Zuckerman at Global Voices Advocacy. (updated March 10th 2009 with the latest Tor / Vidalia bundle details)

WikiLeakS Links

The WikiLeakS.org Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) page.

WikiLeakS Twitter feeds

The WikiLeakS.org website does not stay online all of the time, especially when there is a surge of traffic caused by mainstream media coverage of a particularly newsworthy leak.

Recently, they have been using their new Twitter feeds, to selectively publicise leaked documents to the media, and also to report on the status of routing or traffic congestion problems affecting the main website in Stockholm, Sweden.

N.B.the words "security" or "anonymity" and "Twitter" are mutually exclusive:

WikiLeakS.org Twitter feed via SSL encrypted session: https://twitter.com/wikileaks

WikiLeakS.org unencrypted Twitter feed http://twitter.com/wikileaks

Internet Censorship

OpenNet Initiative - researches and measures the extent of actual state level censorship of the internet. Features a blocked web URL checker and censorship map.

Temporary Autonomous Zone

Temporary Autonomous Zones (TAZ) by Hakim Bey (Peter Lambourn Wilson)

Cyberpunk author William Gibson

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Gary McKinnon is facing extradition to the USA under the controversial Extradition Act 2003, without any prima facie evidence or charges brought against him in a UK court. Try him here in the UK, under UK law.
Gary McKinnon is facing extradition to the USA under the controversial Extradition Act 2003, without any prima facie evidence or charges brought against him in a UK court. Try him here in the UK, under UK law.

FreeFarid_150.jpg
FreeFarid.com - Kafkaesque extradition of Farid Hilali under the European Arrest Warrant to Spain

Peaceful resistance to the curtailment of our rights to Free Assembly and Free Speech in the SOCPA Designated Area around Parliament Square and beyond

Parliament Protest blog - resistance to the Designated Area restricting peaceful demonstrations or lobbying in the vicinity of Parliament.

Petition to the European Commission and European Parliament against their vague Data Retention plans
Data Retention is No Solution Petition to the European Commission and European Parliament against their vague Data Retention plans.

Save Parliament: Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill (and other issues)
Save Parliament - Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill (and other issues)

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Open Rights Group

The Big Opt Out Campaign - opt out of having your NHS Care Record medical records and personal details stored insecurely on a massive national centralised database.

Tor - the onion routing network
Tor - the onion routing network - "Tor aims to defend against traffic analysis, a form of network surveillance that threatens personal anonymity and privacy, confidential business activities and relationships, and state security. Communications are bounced around a distributed network of servers called onion routers, protecting you from websites that build profiles of your interests, local eavesdroppers that read your data or learn what sites you visit, and even the onion routers themselves."

Tor - the onion routing network
Anonymous Blogging with Wordpress and Tor - useful Guide published by Global Voices Advocacy with step by step software configuration screenshots (updated March 10th 2009).

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Amnesty International's irrepressible.info campaign

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BlogSafer - wiki with multilingual guides to anonymous blogging

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NGO in a box - Security Edition privacy and security software tools

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Home Office Watch blog, "a single repository of all the shambolic errors and mistakes made by the British Home Office compiled from Parliamentary Questions, news reports, and tip-offs by the Liberal Democrat Home Affairs team."

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Reporters Without Borders - Reporters Sans Frontières - campaign for journalists 'and bloggers' freedom in repressive countries and war zones.

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Committee to Protect Bloggers - "devoted to the protection of bloggers worldwide with a focus on highlighting the plight of bloggers threatened and imprisoned by their government."

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Wikileaks.org - the controversial "uncensorable, anonymous whistleblowing" website based currently in Sweden.

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