Somewhat naively, WikiLeakS.org claim that
Most documents come in from journalists. Frauds are extremely rare, but possible.
How can they possibly make that assumption ?
It appears that the WikiLeakS.org editors have had second thoughts and now doubt the authenticity of some allegations of tax evasion by a German Architect Juergen Grossman, amongst the documents uploaded and published in the Bank Julius Baer section
This document, its description below as well as comments posted to it are false or falsified according to different sources and investigation into them. Wikileaks is investigating as to why false documents in context to Bank Julius Baer have been put up
The reason why "false documents... have been put up" should be obvious - it is because WikiLeakS.org have created a channel which allows this to be done.
It is also a bit simplistic to think that even reliable sources always provide truthful, accurate and complete information.
Similarly, untested or previously unreliable sources can provide good information, sometimes.
Perhaps WikiLeakS.org need to tag the leaked / published documents like, for example, UK Police Forces do under under the National Intelligence Model, and their 5x5x5 Intelligence Grading form system:
For example:
Intel Source or Intel Source Ref. No:
Police Intelligence databases usually try to keep this secret
See also the previous blog article:
Does linking "Peryton" to several leaks partially betray the WikiLeakS.org promise of anonymity ?
They give an A to F rating for the reliability of the source
Source Evaluation:
- A = Always Reliable
- B = Mostly Reliable
- C = Sometimes Reliable
- D = Unreliable
- E = Untested Source
Then there is a 1 to 5 rating for the accuracy of the information
Intelligence Evaluation:
- 1 = Known to be true without reservation (usually technical forensic information or database records, which is not, of course, always strictly the case))
- 2 = Known personally to the source but not to the officer
- 3 = Not known personally to the source but corroborated
- 4 = Cannot be judged
- 5 = Suspected to be false
The third "x 5" in the UK Police Intelligence Grading scheme is the level Protective Marking and handling restrictions applied to the intelligence data, something which might, perhaps, be of use internally within WikiLeakS.org, but which is redundant for published material.
Handling Code - To be completed at time of entry into an intelligence system and reviewed on dissemination.
- 1 = May be disseminated to other law enforcement and prosecuting agencies, including law enforcement with the EEA and EU compatible (no Code or Conditions)
- 2 = May be disseminated to UK non-prosecuting parties (Code 3.7 conditions apply)
- 3 = May be disseminated to non-EEA law enforcement agencies (Code 4.7 and/or conditions apply, specify below)
- 4 = Only disseminate within originating agency / force. Specify internal recipient(s)
- 5 = Disseminate: Intelligence Receiving agency to observe conditions as specified below.
The European Economic Area (EEA) and the European Union (EU), are covered by similar Data Protection laws, other countries, generally have weaker protections in law, like the USA.
Other Intelligence Agencies and mainstream media organisations presumably do something similar, although they never seem to bother to publish these reliability assessments, and tend to just quote "Government" or "Police" or "Security" sources anonymously.
Another similar model is used by the website GlobalSecurity.org, as caveats and disclaimers on its Terrorist suspect profiles:
Key to bullets
- High confidence
- Some confidence
- Low confidence
- No confidence
More explanation of the GlobalSecurity.org classifications:
Explainer
We've attempted to classify information about various terrorists, organizations and activities by noting our level of confidence in a given piece of information. These are subjective ratings, based on the track record of the sources providing the information. To break it down:
