Channel 4 reality tv programme Hunted manages to get you to suspend disbelief (you quickly ignore the obvious presence of a camera person with each fugitive) as around a dozen "fugitives" are hunted by a team of hunters with
the simulated (in the case of CCTV and ANPR) powers of our UK surveillance state.
It is worthwhile thinking about some of the techniques used in the 4 series so far and how proportionate their use is in any real
cases, apart from the very most serious criminal or national security scenarios.
Twitter hash tag: #Hunted
Channel 4 Hunted home page
Hunters' techniques already used
DVLA vehicle Registered Keeper check
ANPR - Automatic Number Plate Recognition
GPS / Mobile phone vehicle tracking device attached to family / friend's car
Private aeroplane flight plans
AIS - Automatic Identification System boat / ship beacon mapping
Public CCTV - realistically not available in real time except at transport hubs
Bank ATM CCTV
Bank ATM card transaction alert
Mobile hunter teams in distinctive Volvos or BMWs etc. (N.B. product sponsorship deals)
Mobile hunter teams in less distinctive white van etc.
Helicopter surveillance - limited airtime
Drones - limited battery, not so great in bad weather.
N.B. neither helicopters nor drones are likely to be used in near major airport flightpaths
Directed Surveillance "stake out" of fugitives family / friends homes using remote cameras and human watchers.
Sniffer dogs
Mobile Phone subscriber details - registered or burner ?
Mobile phone new SIM card in known IMEI handset
Mobile Phone friendship tree - other numbers called / recived when, how long for
Mobile Phone Location Data - targeted
Mobile Phone Cell Tower dump analysis to detect candidates for people who picked up a fugitive in a relatively isolated town or village at a certain time and then phoned their mate to arrange a further lift or accomodation. Harder to do in a City, but there are more Cell Towers per square kilometre so Location fixes are more accurate and useful to the Hunters ground teams if nearby. N.B. usualy a maximum of 256 simulataneous calls per Cell which can be up to 35 Km wide in the Countryside
Cities can have several micro Cells per street or busy shopping or transport area so give more accurate Location fixes, but make it easier to lose track of a burner phone if it is switched off quickly after use and the fugitives move out of the small Cell area fast enough.
snail mail intercept of letters / postcards
Social Media monitoring
Twitter
FaceBoook
Contact chain mapping / visualisation - IBM i2 Analysts Notebook etc.
Hacking of seized laptops, iPads, SmartPhones after a visit by hunters
Covert Hacking via USB malware of laptops , iPads, SmartPhones during a visit by hunters
Forensic analysis of paper writing pads and note books etc. to reveal writing impressions on the blank paper
Geotagging of SmartPhone Location history from seized phones, showing previous travel locations / possible local friends networks
Encouraging children and other casual occupants of a fugitive's family or friends or casual helper's home to talk about the exciting / famous visitor(s) and where they are going
Local radio and newspaper and social media Reward Appeals
£££ cash rewards for tips to publicised phone line or email address
Bribing £££ with reward offer other casual occupants of a fugitive's family or friends or casual helper's home to talk about the exciting / famous visitor(s) and where they are going
Psychological pressure especially on fugitives with young families - get them to meet family / friends who are being watched.
Social Media taunting of fugitives supected of being very competitive / with strong egos, to get them to post a revenge taunt video or photo, giving hunters clues as to their recent location.
"ghost agent" - Non-hunter private investigator / CHIS acting as undercover agent e.g. picking up hitchikers and taking them to the hunters
Social Engineering / blatantly lying to casual contacts on the phone or in person contradicting the fugitives story to get information on them e.g. drop off point
Social Engineering / offering a financial reward to casual contacts on the phone or in person to get information on the fugitives e.g. drop off point
Hacking in to an Android mobile phone's Google Voice Search search history voice recordings
Hacking in to a Google account showing Google Maps search history
Find from bank records that recent graduate students have money problems.
Exploit this by freezing their bank accounts.
When they are recovering from wet wild camping at a local inn, the Bank Card Transaction Declined pinpoints their exact time and location to the Hunters.
Using up almost all of their cash to pay the bill, forces them to reach out to their (monitored) network of friends
Planting remote CCTV cameras inside and outside a fugitive's sister's cottage - picks up a friend who has gone there to arrange a rendezvous
Physical access to a fugitive contacts' mobile phone - scrolling through recent contacts,
taking screenshots and sending them to HQ for analysis.
Physical access to a fugitive contacts' mobile phone - accessing Deleted Messages remotely
Get real time Mobile Phone pings / Location of a phone travelling down the M1 motorway
e.g. Cell Tower every 10 minutes network handshake (even when the phone is not actually in use)
Offering money reward to captured fugitives to either betray their partners still on the run or to give details of the nominated extraction point.
(previous series offered only a few hundred pouns, February 2019 finale tried £4000 without successs)
Financial bribe offer to captured fugitive made more likely by faking the capture of his partner , using loud cheering and voice samples from social media video clips.
Bellingcat style geolocation analysis of buildings visible through windows etc. of videos or photos posted on social media to narrow down the exact location from distinctive landmarks (no angle of the sun / shadows etc. analysis for Latitude shown yet, but this is possible)
Bugging the taxi which takes a captured fugitive home, so that they give clues from chat with the driver, about the captured fugitive's still on the run partner's plans e.g. that they know someone with an aeroplane
Access to military service records showing that retired 79 year old fugitive Mervyn had been in Territorial SAS and Military Intelligence.
BMW Assist vehicle telematics regualar location fixes and data on when and where the engine is stopped or started, hinting at rendevous points.
Editing together a number of Voice Notes on a captured phone to fake a message to sew distrust with the captured running partner of a fugitive.
Implication tht he will not share the £100,000 prize money with her, she is offered a chance to name a price for information
She tell the hunters that she is not a snitch
Sending a fake burner phone text message to a fugitive's friend from work (identified through social media network link analysis), asking for help to be extraced from the caravan location she has hidden them in.
She does try to authenticate the text message by asking what her dogs' names are. However the hunters find this quickly from FaceBook.
(should have had a pre-arranged duress code / pre shared secret when they were all face to face.
The hunters follow her vehicle without being noticed (classic road surveillance techniques)
Hunters techniques - not yet seen
internal Bus and Train CCTV - can't be real time
London Oyster Travel Card data - some early posters, but was it actually used ?
London Oyster travel Card combined with TfL CCTV
Mobile device Wifi Probes trying to automatically connect back to out of range home or office Wifi
Mobile device Wifi Probes trying to automatically connect back to out of range but distinctive list of "free" WiFi Access Points
GPS coordinates embedded in a digital image posted on social media - Exif metadata - like John McAfee EXIF Data May Have Revealed Location of Fugitive Software Tycoon John McAfee
Digital camera flaw analysis of digital image posted on social media to identify other photos taken with this (borrowed ?) device, which may lead to the owner
GPS Fitness tracker social media app (e.g. Strava) infiltration and analysis to identify competitive runners or swimmers or cyclists who may be contacts
Equivalent of Cell Dump using e.g. Google Maps - who has been downloading map tiles of a certain area at the relevant time for navigation ? Do their
other Map downloads give a clue as to where they are heading ?
GPS navigation device route data from "seized" vehicle that gave the fugitive a lift
GPS navigation device route data from "seized" SmartPhone of a driver gave the fugitive a lift
GPS / Mobile Phone Network tracking of vehicles fitted with E111 emergency "call the ambulance if in a crash" technology
Private Investigator / CHIS cruising the initial Start location, or, when identified the Extraction point as a mini cab driver / Uber driver to pick up fugitives and lead them into the arms of the hunters.
Google Auto Android in car navigation systems using Google Assistant voice recognition and Google Maps on a BlueTooth linked Android mobile phone- .mp3 file forensic artefecats may betray location of a rendezvous or drop off
https://thebinaryhick.blog/2019/01/30/ka-chow-driving-android-auto/
Probably the same for Apple CarPlay and a BlueTooth linked iPhone
Hunters sending a "burner" phone to family / friends of fugitive, pretending it has come from the fugitive, to encourage them to contact them on the fugitive's secret burner phone
N.B. Intercept of such a burner phone and bugging / monitoring thereafter by the hunters
Fugitives' techniques already used
Wigs, and change of clothing disguises
Hats and scarves - most CCTV looks downwards, so these can make it harder for hunters to pick out enough identifying detail of your face
Human decoy disguised as the fugitive
Initial start point disguising of luggage e.g. rucksacks hidden in airline style luggage cases on with wheels
Heading for the countryside along canals etc without urban CCTV
Heading for the countryside to a network of friends
Heading for cities with network of friends
Having a huge network of friends or fans e.g. tv / pop stars with fans, political activists or Free Masons
Burner phone - not enough to swap SIMs - phoning a "watched" number hardly slows the hunters down at all
Disinformation - planting false clues for the hunters
Social Engineering / Blagging lifts / hitchiking
Not giving up when blagging a lift, just jkeep trying until someone is going the way you want.
Social Engineering / Blagging the temporary use of a stranger's mobile phone to make a call
Social Engineering / Blagging the temporary use of a stranger's computer to use the internet etc.
Using an online mobile phone app simulator to send an App message to a physical SmartPhone
Bicycles - no ANPR
Motorbikes / scooters - less chance of ANPR
Taxis - quickly jumping in to e.g. London black cab taxi is better than waiting in the open for a bus, but risks hunters getting drop off details from the driver / company or even internal CCTV
Speed Boat
Helicopter
Celebrity fugitives can hide in a locations which are heavily fortified (Parliament) or surrounded by private security cameras and guards
(multiple private holiday homes estate owned by rich people) inaccessible to the Hunters.
Well resourced (Celebrity) fugitives seem to have multiple helpers and decoy vehicles - stretch the Hunters' resources
on a getaway.
Letting down the Hunters' Volvo car tyres worked at least once !
Hiding somewhat from village CCTV by using a closely held umbrella hiding your face
- quite normals in wet and windy Wales.
Not being seen to be travelling together on a train - but only if you do not need the comfort and support of a travelling partner when under stress
Asking someone to pass a note to your friend in the next train carriage - good but limited uses.
Getting off a an infrequent rural bus service *before* it reaches its destination in the nearest town (Abergavenny)
and heading into the countryside.
Taking aa bus from Wells to Bristol but getting a lift to partway along the route rather than starting from the CCTV monitored bus station.
Wearing a white hat amongst a crowd of Panama hat wearing tourists and locals.
Pre-arranged Word Code e.g. "Pepsi Max" delivery time / location in SMS texts - if too anamolous from the "normal" usage
then these stand out suspiciously and Cell Location gives the ganme away.
(Should really use an Encrypted Messenger e.g. Signal Messenger or WhatsApp)
Use of pre-assumed obscure knowledge as a word code e.g. "meet me at the place that I first worked at in London" - N.B. Celebrities especially vulnerable to such a reference being quickly decoded via a Google searchulnerable
Not running immediately (so as not to draw attention) when you have spotted / heard a reconnaisance Drone overhead, then getting under wooded cover and waiting for the limited battery life to expire like the Royal Marine Matt Mason did.
Fugitive's wife using FaceBook App to call a friend in contact with the fugitives (Communications MetaData still available to the Hunters)
Splitting up temporarily so that fugitive A can meet his sister. Other fugutive B posts a real time Instagram video with a friend disguised as fugitive A, to draw away the attention of then hunters.
This works, but later CCTV analysis shows the deception (too late).
Hand held walkie talkies to keep in touch with each other whilst approaching a possible meet up.
Old school no social media presence at all.
Managing to withdraw £100 cash from a bank branch cashier in a strange town, without your bank card.
Future fugitives should practice this and memorise account number, recent transactions and offline / phone banking security questions.
Using Xbox Live VOIP Voice Over IP calls between gamers - the hunters cannot (yet) intercept this, but Xbox users are usually obvious amongst fugitives' social media
A stranger helping a fugitive uses a Virtual Private Network VPN to connect to the internet "without being traced" to view the social media campaign Wanted Poster
Pretending to have split up from a fugitive's partner, phoning youe mother, knowing the hunters will trace the location of decoy phone call, but quickly escaping from the location by vehicle.
Fugitives' techniques - not yet seen
burner phone to burner phone communications to friends or family
WiFi or Ethernet connection hacking to get "anonymous" access to the internet
Use of Tor or a foreign based VPN
Use of mobile phone 3G or 4G PAYG data packages to get mobile internet access on the run
Use of Satellite Phones - easy to intercept but hard to jam or find the exact location of
Counter bribes - if social media / local press & radio campaign offering £200 , offer people giving you lift £500 as you have a chance of winning £100,000
Getting friends to run a counter Have You Spotted this Hunter social media campaign with £££ rewards on offer - fake Wanted Posters unnerved them a bit previously
Infilitrating / surveilling the Hunters' HQ
Covertly grabbing identifiable WiFi and BlueTooth MAC addresses and Probe SSIDs etc. from the Hunters, when a family member or friend is interviewed
Getting a ticket / bus / train bound e.g. for London but getting off at a stop before.
Getting a ticket but not catching the bus / train / tube / aeroplane etc. at the nominal start, but at a later intermediate stop along the journey.
Purchasing multiple transport tickets or a "roam anywhere" ticket
Using an Amazon or other courier to get a package with a burner phone to a friend or family member via an Amazon Locker or other non-home parcel pick up point
Pair of fugitives splitting up so that one of them can distract the hunters near the extraction point, letting the other escape / win the prize
Other contestants spotting you near the extraction point and dobbing you in, to distract hunter resources so they vcan escape / win the prize
USA Hunted technique of enrolling the good looking fugitive(s) on dating apps in an area, and then posting £££ reward info to the people who have seen or even flirted with the fugitives
Radio Monitoring the airwaves / listening to walkie talkie radio of approaching hunter teams
Radio Detecting the presence of hunter teams via their bluetooth headphone / microphones
Uber app taxi alternative - given the snooping and mapping, is this worth the risk of central digital betrays to the hunters or malware a cloned SmartPhone ?
Setting up pre-arranged series of random code words (memorised not written or stored electronically) with family / friends either as a word code about specific locations, dates, times or as authenticators of ad hoc messages(hunters have intercepted and faked postal mail messages)
e.g. getting a friendly stranger to email or social media a message to family / friends including a code word to prove its authenticity
Mobile Phone Encrypted Messenger Apps over public WiFi or via burner Data SIM
Pre-arranged DeadDrops for money or burner phones or messages to / from family & friends etc.
Using a prepaid Virtual Post Box service to scan and electronically forward postal mail in another country, to allow fugitives to remain in contact
with their family, friends network
https://britishexpatguide.co.uk/the-best-uk-virtual-postbox-for-mail-forwarding/
Fugitives' Errors
Buses and Trains are a bit of a trap unless hunters think you are not using them
Contacting loved ones - an essential part of the dramatic tension of the show
Taunting the Hunters
Not taking *all* available cash at an ATM
Ignoring multiple sightings of distinctive hunters' Volvo cars
Being noticably loud / obnoxious to pub / hotel staff
Failing to tip pub / hotel staff - no reason for them not to claima £££ reward if offered
Expecting a taxi driver not to give up info on drop off point if offered £££ reward
Wearing a bin liner over your head makes you stand out on CCTV, *not* the reverse !
Just changing the SIM in your mobile phone handset does nothing to stop it being tracked via the IMEI serial number sent with every voice or data call.
Getting too paranoid about real time CCTV in rural areas - the Hunters might be able to get yesterday's footage, but it could take a week
Not being paranoid enough about real time CCTV in major city centres and bus / rail / airports etc.
More dominant / arrogant partner destroying the trust of the other fugitive partner when under pressure, by doing something percieved to be selfish, without consulatation, leadng to a break up.
Not keeping a sharp lookout for Volvo cars
Trying to get accomplices to trap a Hunters's car at a rendezvous you have tipped them off to by taunting them
(a couple of fugitives have tried this - very risky)
Trying to crawl past CCTV cameras like caterpillars
Putting a cover over a CCTV camera but being recognisably filmed actually doing it.
Only using 1 burner phone - the family / friend / contact *also* needs a burner phone they never use
Forces the hunters to try Co-Traveller / Cell Site Dumps which need lots more analysis which might not be feasible in time to be useful for the next meeting / pickup / drop off
Family member's mobile phone ping location reveals approximately where they have met a fugitive - regardless of wjether the phone was used during the journey to and from the rendezvous.
Turn the phone off at least for e.g. an hour's travel time before and after the meeting.
Drawing the curtains on the ground floor during the day time, making the address stand out to the hunters scanning the street.
Hunters' Errors and Limitations
Most of the power and resources are with the Hunters, so most of their near misses or failed captures have been literally only by a few minutes or seconds (with approriate suspension of disbelief)
They have fallen for a few of the wily / arrogant fugitives false trails and decoys i.e. deliberately false clues as to location
They have misjudged people who have helped the fugitives e.g. offering a £££ reward / bribe, and then thinking it was working only to be told that the "informant" had changed their mind or would not "grass" for the small sum offered.
The randomness of some of the fugitives hitchhiking has caused the Hunters problems in trying to guess where they might be
Where the Hunters were seen to be blatantly lying to get information, they risked the ire of the tv audience.
Despite the power of thermal imaging from (limited endurance) helicopters or drones, so far, each of the times this technology has been used by thehynters, it has only found false positve wild animals or innocent members of the public, rather than the fugitives, who it has, of course frightened and added to their stress levels, but not enough to matter.
ANPR on very busy roads e.g. M1 motorway is available, but not in real time if the exact
vehicle being searched for is not (yet) known simply due to the volume of traffic.
Using identifiable black Volvo vehicles which tip off the fugitives tht the ground hunters are close by.
Beware of the Extraction Point Instructions communication method
Web bugging the USB with the fugitive extractiomn instructions to betray the IP address and thus approximate location of where it was opened
(fugitives should make sure the internet is disconnected if they need to do this again)
Accessing a pre-recorded phone message: ""By accessing this message your exact location has been revealed to the hunters!"
Fugitives should use a burner phone or one borrowed from a stranger or get a friend to do this (if they have secure communications with them)
For most people this will not be a problem, but for quite a few out of the expected hundreds of thousands of marchers, there could be a risk pf
being targeted and harassed for their political activities or spammed by inappropriate advertising.
UPDATE: UK activists can learn some lesssons from the Hong Kong Protests where people are rightly worried about future State discrimination or repression against those opposing the current government on the streets.
Operational Security precautions only work forwards in time, not retrospectively when it is too late. It is likely that some near future demonstrations will become violent, if there are food or fuel shortages etc. after the Brexit crash out which the current government seems to be planning or cannot avoid.
Police, intelligence agencies and political fanatics will attempt to link future violence to past peaceful political activism, simply because the unregulated data is, or may be made available to them. You only have to look at the false arrests of e,g, drone hobbyists after the Gatwick Airport debacle in December 2018 to fear bureaucrats under political and media pressure to "arrest the usual suspects"
In parallel with the Centre for Investigative Journalism Conspiracy, The 2018 CIJ Logan Symposium.#LoganCIJ https://tcij.org/conspiracy
Twitter: @cijlogan
Friday 19th October 2018, 6.30 pm - 10.30 pm
St. James Hatcham Building,
Goldsmiths,
University of London,
New Cross,
London SE14 6NW
https://www.gold.ac.uk/find-us/places/st-james-hatcham-building/
More information and Schedule
Twitter: @CryptoPartyLDN
Given the number of Investigative Journalists and some of the Spies Who Watch Them who will be attending the CIJ Logan Symposium,
this should be interesting.
SpyBlog will be leading a workssop:
First Contact Problem - Under what threat models can journalists and activists protect their anonymous sources / contacts and vice versa ? How can their communications and meetings be kept private ? Also the regular Anonymity SwapShop - bring along spare social media accounts, SIM Cards, burner phones, Oyster Travel Cards etc. to swap or barter with other people, to help break the financial and CCTV purchase trails.]]>
Monday 16th July 2018 6.30 pm to late
Ju Ju's Bar & Stage, 15 Hanbury St, E1 6QR
No registration, free entry (licensed premises)
https://goo.gl/maps/fivDjihSQ4S2
More information and Schedule
Twitter: @CryptoPartyLDN
Tuesday 19th June 2018 6.30 pm to late
Ju Ju's Bar & Stage, 15 Hanbury St, E1 6QR
No registration, free entry (licensed premises)
https://goo.gl/maps/fivDjihSQ4S2
More information and Schedule
Twitter: @CryptoPartyLDN
]]>https://www.cryptoparty.in/london
As promised here is the slide deck:
Digital trail chasing: using open source intelligence techniques to find how much information is public about you and your friends. (SpyBlog @spyblog)
Digital Trail Chasing slides .pdf .pptx .odp
#CryptoParty Crypto Party London @cryptopartyLDN Cocktail Menu - Excellent
"Quantum-resistant Raspberry"
50% GPG
25% Tails
25% Tor Browser
@jujusbarstage (Raspberry Sidecar - Courvoisier Cognac, Chambord Cointreau, Sugar Syrup, Lime Juice)
https://www.cryptoparty.in/london
As promised here is the slide deck:
Demonstration of Mobile Device WiFi Operational (In)Security.pptx
8 minutes video clip of Theresam May's statement:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jcRj5qNDOFg
PM statement following London terror attack: 4 June 2017
Last night, our country fell victim to a brutal terrorist attack once again. As a result I have just chaired a meeting of the government’s emergency committee and I want to update you with the latest information about the attack.Shortly before 10:10 yesterday evening, the Metropolitan Police received reports that a white van had struck pedestrians on London Bridge. It continued to drive from London Bridge to Borough Market, where 3 terrorists left the van and attacked innocent and unarmed civilians with blades and knives.
All 3 were wearing what appeared to be explosive vests, but the police have established that this clothing was fake and worn only to spread panic and fear.
As so often in such serious situations, the police responded with great courage and great speed. Armed officers from the Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police arrived at Borough Market within moments, and shot and killed the 3 suspects. The terrorists were confronted and shot by armed officers within 8 minutes of the police receiving the first emergency call.
8 minutes is the length of Theresa May's statement. Ignore all the gun nuts who pretend that arming individual policemen would have killed the attackers any quicker.
Seven people have died as a result of the attack, in addition to the 3 suspects shot dead by the police. Forty-eight people are being treated in several hospitals across London. Many have life-threatening conditions.On behalf of the people of London, and on behalf of the whole country, I want to thank and pay tribute to the professionalism and bravery of the police and the emergency services - and the courage of members of the public who defended themselves and others from the attackers. And our thoughts and prayers are with the victims and with their friends, families and loved ones.
This is, as we all know, the third terrorist attack Britain has experienced in the last 3 months. In March, a similar attack took place, just around the corner on Westminster Bridge. Two weeks ago, the Manchester Arena was attacked by a suicide bomber. And now London has been struck once more.
And at the same time, the security and intelligence agencies and police have disrupted 5 credible plots since the Westminster attack in March.
In terms of their planning and execution, the recent attacks are not connected. But we believe we are experiencing a new trend in the threat we face, as terrorism breeds terrorism, and perpetrators are inspired to attack not only on the basis of carefully-constructed plots after years of planning and training - and not even as lone attackers radicalised online - but by copying one another and often using the crudest of means of attack.
That must mean that the terrorist suspects have been identified between Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis Cressida Dick's statement earlier today that she
and Theresa May's statement, or is this just political licence with the facts ?
We cannot and must not pretend that things can continue as they are. Things need to change, and they need to change in 4 important ways.First, while the recent attacks are not connected by common networks, they are connected in one important sense. They are bound together by the single, evil ideology of Islamist extremism that preaches hatred, sows division, and promotes sectarianism. It is an ideology that claims our Western values of freedom, democracy and human rights are incompatible with the religion of Islam. It is an ideology that is a perversion of Islam and a perversion of the truth.
Defeating this ideology is one of the great challenges of our time. But it cannot be defeated through military intervention alone. It will not be defeated through the maintenance of a permanent, defensive counter-terrorism operation, however skilful its leaders and practitioners. It will only be defeated when we turn people’s minds away from this violence - and make them understand that our values - pluralistic, British values - are superior to anything offered by the preachers and supporters of hate.
All very true, exactly what previous Prime Ministers e.g. Tony Blair have said time and time again
Second, we cannot allow this ideology the safe space it needs to breed. Yet that is precisely what the internet - and the big companies that provide internet-based services - provide. We need to work with allied, democratic governments to reach international agreements that regulate cyberspace to prevent the spread of extremism and terrorist planning. And we need to do everything we can at home to reduce the risks of extremism online.
We need Safe Spaces for Internet Free Speech and to do Digital Commerce, free from snooping by evil governments, corporations, criminals and terrorists.
Trying to clamp down on foreign internet companies providing End To End Encrypted services wil not stop terrorist extremists from recruiting or planning. It will destroy Freedom of Speech and the UK Digital Economy, which needs all the help it can get to survive the #Brexit disaster.
Is the UK Government really willing to hand over intelligence watchlists of terrorist sympathiser unconvicted *suspects* to foreign internet companies like FaceBook or Twitter so that they can pro-actively censor their social media ?
That seems unlikely.
Third, while we need to deprive the extremists of their safe spaces online, we must not forget about the safe spaces that continue to exist in the real world. Yes, that means taking military action to destroy ISIS in Iraq and Syria. But it also means taking action here at home. While we have made significant progress in recent years, there is - to be frank - far too much tolerance of extremism in our country.So we need to become far more robust in identifying it and stamping it out - across the public sector and across society. That will require some difficult and often embarrassing conversations, but the whole of our country needs to come together to take on this extremism - and we need to live our lives not in a series of separated, segregated communities but as one truly United Kingdom.
Where exactly are these mythical "Safe Spaces" for islamist extremism in the Public Sector or in British Society ??
What precisely does she mean by "embarassing conversations", with whom ?
Fourth, we have a robust counter-terrorism strategy that has proved successful over many years. But as the nature of the threat we face becomes more complex, more fragmented, more hidden, especially online, the strategy needs to keep up. So in light of what we are learning about the changing threat, we need to review Britain’s counter-terrorism strategy to make sure the police and security services have all the powers they need.
We already have the most intrusive anti-terrorism legal powers in the world, including all encompassing Thought Crime laws, what more can they actually enforce properly ?
And if we need to increase the length of custodial sentences for terrorism-related offences, even apparently less serious offences, that is what we will do.
If there is little or no difference in the penalty for "serious" and "less serious" crimes, this will make it easier for terrorist recruiters to convert peripheral supporters into active terrorist atttackers - "in for a penny, in for a pound".
Again, this all sounds tediously familiar, just like previous Tory and labour governemts e.g. Tony Blair's ratcheting up of repressive terrorism laws.
Will the excerable Jeremy Corbyn and the current Labour control freaks also support this ?
Since the emergence of the threat from Islamist-inspired terrorism, our country has made significant progress in disrupting plots and protecting the public. But it is time to say enough is enough. Everybody needs to go about their lives as they normally would. Our society should continue to function in accordance with our values. But when it comes to taking on extremism and terrorism, things need to change.As a mark of respect the 2 political parties have suspended our national campaigns for today. But violence can never be allowed to disrupt the democratic process. So those campaigns will resume in full tomorrow. And the general election will go ahead as planned on Thursday.
How is standing outside 10 Downing Street with maximum media coverage, announcing new policies, "suspending campaigning" ??
Few people will believe that this is a genuine mark of respect, it is more likely an excuse for the politicians (in all political parties)
to avoid embarassing questions about their failed / lack of coherent policies regarding terrorism.
Allowing the terrorists to disrupt the General Election in any way, is a victory for the the ideology that the Prime Minister so rightly condemned above.
]]>As a country, our response must be as it has always been when we have been confronted by violence. We must come together, we must pull together, and united we will take on and defeat our enemies.
The venerable Law Commission has started off this process with a detailed Consultation.
c.f.
Protection of Official Data Consultation 325 page (.pdf)
Duration of the consultation: We invite responses from 1 February 2017 to 3 April 2017.Comments may be sent:
By email to pod@lawcommission.gsi.gov.uk
OR
By post to Criminal Law Team, Law Commission, 1st Floor, Tower, 52 Queen Anne’s
Gate, London, SW1H 9AG.
Tel: 020 3334 3100 / Fax: 020 3334 0201
If you send your comments by post, it would be helpful if, whenever possible, you could also send them electronically (for example, on CD or by email to the above address, in any
commonly used format).
However, their Threat Modelling seems incomplete. We need to ask ourselves exactly what exactly are we are trying to protect and from whom ? Expanding the definitions
to cover terrorist organisations rather than the undefined Enemy countries is ok, but it does nothing about "lone wolf" terrorists or fanatics.
It is all very well getting rid of restrictive pre WW1 terms like "models, sketches, drawings" etc. but there is only 1 passing reference to the Internet and mention of Protection of of Official MetaData or anything to do with Cryptography.
Nor are there any proposals to deal with the vast problem of Over Classification of government data and documents.
Will whistleblowers or journalists investigating UK #Brexit trade negotiating positions now fall foul of the new proposed legislation ?
http://spyblog.org.uk/ssl/spyblog/mi5-email-subscriptions/
Here we go again:
To quote MI5 's own "Cyber" section of their website:
Hostile actors
A wide range of hostile actorshttps://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/index.html use cyber to target the UK. They include foreign states, criminals, "hacktivist" groups and terrorists. The resources and capabilities of such actors vary. Foreign states are generally equipped to conduct the most damaging cyber espionage and computer network attacks.
Hostile actors conducting cyber espionage can target the government, military, business and individuals.
There are 4 sections of the MI5 Security Service website:
Whilst the first two sections are important for the public image and reputation of MI5, the last two (Careers and Tip Off form) are of intense interest to our enemies.
Even the https:// only website does use a Digital Certificate with good Transport Layer Security configuration,
N.B. In common with GCHQ and MI6 there is no DNS entry for https://MI5.gov.uk i.e. without the "www."
This tends to confuse the dimmer "hackivists" who frequently claim that their "script kiddy" Denial of Service attacks have somehow magically succeeded in a "tango down" of a non-existent website URL.
Accessing the MI5 Security Service website may be illegal or dangerous if you are in e.g. the Middle East or Russia or China etc.
so, for obvious reasons, they claim to keep your communications with them confidential.
You may decide to use the increasingly popular Tor Browser to hide your originating IP address.
Why then does the MI5 website betray your web browser meta data to one and possibly two foreign companies based in the USA i.e. CloudFlare and Google reCaptcha ?
CloudFlare, whilst providing useful TLS and anti Denial of Service attack services, is under heavy criticism for forcing Tor users to fill in stupid Google reCapture puzzles #dontblocktorto proceed to a "protected" website.
This is a minor inconvenience for most people, but it is completely inappropriate for an intelligence agency website with sensitive recruitment and national security tip off form features.
https://p10.secure.hostingprod.com/@spyblog.org.uk/ssl/spyblog/images/MI5_reCaptcha/MI5_home_page_Captcha.jpg
Regardless of whether a visitor is using Tor or not, if they want to to contact MI5 with a national security related tip off, the Google reCaptcha is embedded in the the "secure" contact form!
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/contact-us
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/contact-us
i.e. there are image links which do not go to the local MI5 web server, or any web servers in the United Kingdom, but which are pulled from Google in California, USA
e.g. the Google reCaptcha refresh image (and all the street sign or river etc. reCapture image tiles)
https://www.gstatic.com/recaptcha/api2/refresh.png
This creates a web log entry or "Internet Connection Record" in the new Investigatory Powers Bill doublespeak, in a foreign country, regardless of whether you fill in the form or not.
If you are using e.g. Firefox without Tor and your IP address does not trigger Cloudflare, then you may be able to get to the non-Javascript MI5 web contact form
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/modal_forms/nojs/webform/363
but most people will have been tricked into handing over their meta data to these US companies and therefore to the US government (on demand), instead of just
sharing it with MI5 the Security Service in the United Kingdom
Here is Spy Blog's contribution to the consultation.
Apart from a very specific, rarely used scenario, involving intimate searches by police officers before medical personnel are available, Note how every single point has been ignored by the Home Office.
Intrusive Powers missing from the list of core powers of Police Constables
"Proposed ‘core’ list of powers that would only be available to police officers, i.e. would notbe available for designation to staff or volunteers
[...]
7. The two most intrusive powers under RIPA, i.e.
a. Requesting a warrant to intercept communications; and
b. Acting as a Covert Human Intelligence Source (i.e. an undercover officer)."There are two more intrusive powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) which must *not* be delegated to non-Constables:
RIPA Part II Access to Communications Data
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/22
RIPA Part III section 49 Notices demanding encryption keys or de-crypted plaintext material.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/49
These intrusive powers are already too widely available to "any Constable" and should *only* be allowed to specialist IT trained teams of full Police Constables. It would be a disaster for public trust and confidence if these powers were to be delegated to staff and volunteers.
The Home Office's claims about Trust, Transparency and Accountability in the controversial "Snoopers'Charter" Draft Investigatory Powers Bill are worthless if these vast Police Powers under RIPA are farmed out to unaccountable Volunteers or commercially sub-contracted civilian Staff.
Intimate Searches and Intimate Body Samples
Intimate Searches including Stripping and searches of intimate body orifices and the sometimes forced taking of blood or other Intimate Body Samples are not mentioned on this core list of Police Constable powers.
It must therefore be assumed that the Home Office is planning to to allow these extremely intrusive powers to be farmed out to non-Constables.
This must *not* happen - it is likely to literally cause a riot.
Misconduct in Public Office must apply to Staff and Volunteers
Staff and Volunteers are not Police Officers or Officers of the Crown. Why should they simply face dismissal if they abuse Police Powers delegated to them, when a Police Constable doing exactly the same thing could face up to life in prison for Misconduct in Public Office ?
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/misconduct_in_public_office/
The offence of Misconduct in Public Office must be clearly and unambiguously extended to cover Staff and Volunteers who have been given Designated or Delegated Police Powers, in anticipation of when, not if, some of them abuse these powers.
Too complicated to be transparent, therefore illegal.
The current system of discretionary powers is already opaque and obscure - the general public has no means of telling exactly what powers a PCSO etc. has in one area compared with a person wearing a similar uniform and having the same designation in an other Police Force Area.
There is no central, easily accessible (e.g. via the world wide web) authoritative, up to date list of which Discretionary Powers are currently in force in which Police Force.
I challenge anyone reading this to find such a list on the internal Home Office or Police Force intranets, within 30 minutes, let alone on their public facing websites.
It is obvious that costly delays on the street will result from the even more complicated mish mash of proposed Discretionary and Delegated Police Powers.
Designation / Delegations from more than one Chief Constable = confusion & red tape
Is, for example, a Escort Officer meant to get two seperate Designations, attend two different but equivalent training courses, from two neighbouring Police Forces before they can transfer arrestees across a Police Force boundary ?
What if the arrest is in Newcastle and the Police Station is in London ? Do they have to get rubber stamped by every Chief Constable along the route ?
Given the principles of natural justice and the legal precedents, it is likely that any such deliberately or negligently obscure system of police powers will be found to be illegal when, not if, cases are brought in the UK Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice.
National police powers for each role, clearly stated in primary legislation
It would be better if Chief Constables had no discretion to designate or delegate any powers.
Neither should the Home Secretary be able to add to complexity and obscurity with Order making powers.
The powers of Police Constables, Police Community Support officers, Investigation Officers and Escort officers should be clearly laid out in the text of primary legislation.
Since there is at least one Police or Justice etc. Act every single Parliament, there is plenty of opportunity to amend such powers in the light of practical experience.
All such powers should apply Nationally, across all Police Force boundaries, just like those of full Police Constables.
]]>JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL
CALL FOR WRITTEN EVIDENCEThe Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, chaired by Lord Murphy of Torfaen, was appointed by the two Houses of Parliament in late November 2015 to consider the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, which was presented to the two Houses on 4 November 2015. The Committee invites any interested individuals and organisations to submit evidence to this inquiry.
The Committee in particular will explore the key issues listed below in detail, and would welcome your views on any or all of the following questions. Please note that questions are not listed here in any particular order of importance.
Written evidence should arrive no later than 21 December 2015. Public hearings will be held in November and December 2015 and January 2016. The Committee has been asked to report to the Houses, with recommendations, in February 2016. The report will receive a response from the Government. The time available for the Committee’s inquiry is short, and its focus will be on the contents of the draft Bill rather than more general aspects of policy. The Committee will not consider as part of its inquiry the merits of individual cases which have been, or are now, subject to formal proceedings in courts or tribunals.
Overarching/thematic questions:
Are the powers sought necessary?
o Has the case been made, both for the new powers and for the restated and clarified existing powers? Are the powers sought legal?
o Are the powers compatible with the Human Rights Act and the ECHR? Is the requirement that they be exercised only when necessary and proportionate fully addressed? Are they sufficiently clear and accessible on the face of the draft Bill? Is the legal framework such that CSPs (especially those based abroad) will be persuaded to comply? Are concerns around accessing journalists’, legally privileged and MPs' communications sufficiently addressed?
Are the powers sought workable and carefully defined?
o Are the technological definitions accurate and meaningful (e.g. content vs communications data, internet connection records etc.)? Does the draft Bill adequately explain the types of activity that could be undertaken under these powers? Is the wording of the powers sustainable in the light of rapidly evolving technologies and user behaviours? Overall is the Bill future-proofed as it stands?
Are the powers sought sufficiently supervised?
o Is the authorisation process appropriate? Will the oversight bodies be able adequately to scrutinise their operation? What ability will Parliament and the public have to check and raise concerns about the use of these powers?
Specific questions:
General
To what extent is it necessary for
(a) the security and intelligence services and
(b) law enforcement to have access to investigatory powers such as those contained in the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill? Are there any additional investigatory powers that security and intelligence services or law enforcement agencies should have which are not included in the draft Bill?
Are the new offences proposed in the draft Bill necessary? Are the suggested punishments appropriate?
Interception
Are there sufficient operational justifications for undertaking
(a) targeted and
(b) bulk interception? Are the proposed authorisation processes for such interception activities appropriate? Is the proposed process for authorising urgent warrants workable?
Are the proposed safeguards sufficient for the secure retention of material obtained from interception?
How well does the current process under Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) work for the acquisition of communications data? What will be the effect of the extra-territorial application of the provisions on communications data in the draft Bill?
Communications Data
Are the definitions of content and communications data (including the distinction between 'entities' and 'events' sufficiently clear and practical for the purposes of accessing such data?
Does the draft Bill allow the appropriate organisations, and people within those
organisations, access to communications data? Are there sufficient operational justifications for accessing communications data in bulk?
Is the authorisation process for accessing communications data appropriate?
Data Retention
Do the proposed authorisation regime and safeguards for bulk data retention meet the requirements set out in the CJEU Digital Rights Ireland and the Court of Appeal Davis judgments?
Is accessing Internet Connection Records essential for the purposes of IP resolution and identifying of persons of interest? Are there alternative mechanisms? Are the proposed safeguards on accessing Internet Connection Records data appropriate?
Are the requirements placed on service providers necessary and feasible?
Equipment Interference
Should the security and intelligence services have access to powers to undertake
(a) targeted and
(b) bulk equipment interference? Should law enforcement also have access to such powers? Are the authorisation processes for such equipment interference activities appropriate?
Are the safeguards for such activities sufficient?
Bulk Personal Data
Is the use of bulk personal datasets by the security and intelligence services appropriate? Are the safeguards sufficient for the retention and access of potentially highly sensitive data?
Oversight
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed creation of a single Judicial Commission to oversee the use of investigatory powers?
Would the proposed Judicial Commission have sufficient powers, resources and independence to perform its role satisfactorily?
Are the appointment and accountability arrangements for Judicial Commissioners appropriate?
Are the new arrangements for the Investigatory Powers Tribunal including the possibility of appeal adequate or are further changes necessary?
GUIDANCE FOR SUBMISSIONS
Written evidence should be submitted online using the written submission form available at www.parliament.uk/draft-investigatory-powers-submission-form. This page also provides guidance on submitting evidence.
If you have difficulty submitting evidence online, please contact the Committee staff by email to
draftinvestigatorypowersbill@parliament.uk
or by telephoning 020 7219 8443. The deadline for written evidence is 21 December 2015.
Short submissions are preferred. A submission longer than six pages should include a onepage
summary.Paragraphs should be numbered. All submissions made through the written submission form will be acknowledged automatically by email.
Evidence which is accepted by the Committee may be published online at any stage; when it is so published it becomes subject to parliamentary copyright and is protected by parliamentary privilege. Submissions which have been previously published will not be accepted as evidence. Once you have received acknowledgement that the evidence has been accepted you will receive a further email, and at this point you may publicise or publish your
evidence yourself. In doing so you must indicate that it was prepared for the Committee, and you should be aware that your publication or re-publication of your evidence may not be protected by parliamentary privilege.Personal contact details will be removed from evidence before publication, but will be retained by the Committee Office and used for specific purposes relating to the Committee's work, for instance to seek additional information.
Persons who submit written evidence, and others, may be invited to give oral evidence. Oral evidence is usually given in public at Westminster and broadcast online; transcripts are also taken and published online. Persons invited to give oral evidence will be notified separately of the procedure to be followed and the topics likely to be discussed.
Substantive communications to the Committee about the inquiry should be addressed through the clerk of the Committee, whether or not they are intended to constitute formal evidence to the Committee.
This is a public call for evidence. Please bring it to the attention of other groups and individuals who may not have received a copy direct.
You may follow the progress of the inquiry at www.parliament.uk/draft-investigatorypow
Draft Investigatory Powers Bill Joint Committee - membership
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/draft-investigatory-powers-bill/membership/
The target date for the scrutiny of this complicated 200 page Bill is set for 11th February 2016, which really is not enough time to do a thorough job, given the Christmas and New Year holidays.
Member | Affiliation | Notes |
---|---|---|
Victoria Atkins MP | Conservative | Barrister specialising in fraud, stood unsuccessfully in the Police and Crime Commissioner elections for Gloucestershire Constabulary |
Suella Fernandes MP | Conservative | Barrister |
Rt Hon David Hanson MP | Labour | Former Home Office Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing |
Stuart C McDonald MP | SNP | Former immigration lawyer |
Dr Andrew Murrison MP | Conservative | Medical doctor and ex Royal Navy Surgeon-Commander |
Matt Warman MP | Conservative | Former technology editor of Daily Telegraph |
Baroness Browning | Conservative | Former Home Office Minister of State in the House of Lords |
Lord Butler of Brockwell | Crossbench | Former member of Intelligence & Security Committee (did look at previous Draft Comms Data Bill) , former Cabinet Secretary |
Bishop of Chester | Bishops | BA in Chemistry before becoming a cleric |
Lord Hart of Chilton | Labour | Former planning solicitor & Special Advisor |
Lord Henley | Conservative | Former Home Office Minister Crime Prevention and Anti-Social Behaviour Reduction |
Lord Murphy of Torfaen | Labour | Chairman of this Committee,former Chair of Intelligence & Security Committee (which failed to properly investigate 7/7 2005 London bombings etc.) |
Lord Strasburger | Liberal Democrat | Businessman, only member of previous Draft Communications Data Bill committee. |
Note the preponderance of likely "gone native" politicians with "experience" of Policing and Intelligence agencies.
Who will be elected as Chair of this Joint Committee ? Lord Butler the supposedly Cross Bench former Cabinet Secretary ?
Only Lord Strasburger (Liberal Democrat) served on the previous Draft Communications Data Bill Joint Committee, although Lord Butler of Brockwell did scrutinise some of it as a then member of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
]]>Commons Hansard 19 Oct 2015 : Column 694
Almost no MPs bothered to attend this Emergency Debate on the operation of the Wilson Doctrine.
The MPs who did speak:
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
Mr Peter Bone (Wellingborough) (Con)
Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)
Lady Hermon (North Down) (Ind):
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
Andrew Gwynne (Denton and Reddish) (Lab)
Tom Pursglove (Corby) (Con)
Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
Mr David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab)
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)
Ms Margaret Ritchie (South Down) (SDLP)
Gavin Robinson (Belfast East) (DUP)
Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)
Martin John Docherty (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)
Will Her Majesty's Opposition hold the Government to account over this shoddy deception ? Or will the Corbynistas be overshadowed by the Scottish Nationalists ? Will the handful of Conservative MPs who seem to care about liberty and privacy and freedom have any effect on the Government ?
Chris Bryant, who lead this Emergency Debate, made a lot of sense in his analysis of the current Wilson Doctrine debacle, but the attitude of the rest of the Labour party, almost none of whom bothered to turn up, is still suspiciously unclear.
He rightly chided the Home Secretary for rushing through the Data retention and Investigatory powers Act in a single day, and hoped that the forthcoming Investigatory Powers Bill which might be able to ut the Wilson Doctrine or similar into law would not be similarly rushed through.
Andy Burnham (Lab) the Shadow Home Secretary turned up for a bit, and lurked next to Chris Bryant, but did not bother to speak
Where was the Deputy Leader Tom Watson (Lab), who is supposed to be a patron of the Open Rights Group and who did ask the Question which prompted Theresa May's "caveated statement" on the Wilson Doctrine earlier this year ? ?
Where were the Corbynistas ?
Dominic Grieve's contribution to the debate was restricted to promising that as Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the Committee would consider MP and Constituency interception procedures along with other legally privileged lawyers and journalists etc.
Given the other things they must look into, it is unclear if they will contribute anything before the full Investigatory Powers Bill is set in motion early next year.
Peter Bone yet again asked the Home Secretary how many MPs have had their telephones intercepted since 1966. Her silence confirms that the number is clearly not zero, making a mockery of even the very narrow definition of the Wilson Doctrine which is now being spun by the Government.
David Davis correctly summed up the Wilson Doctrine is effectively dead:
"the doctrine is dead. Whether or not it is legally dead, it is in practice dead. It is dead in the eyes of the people--whistleblowers, campaigners and so on--who might come to us, and we have to do something to replace it."He also mentioned the vital importance of metadata, which the Wilson Doctrine sneakily does not "protect".
Spy Blog would also like to see protection for Constituents, Campaigners, Journalists, Whistleblowers and other elected representatives all the other RIPA an non-IPA surveillance techniques included in the new Investigatory Powers Bill e.g. MetaData / Communications data / Traffic Data (RIPA 2000 Part II) , compelled access access to Encrypted Data (RIPA III), CHIS Covert Human Intelligence Sources (informers and infiltrators), bugging and tracking devices (Police Act 1997 Part III) etc.
The Scottish Nationalist Party outnumbered the Labour Party and emphasised the need for Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, Northern Ireland Assembly and UK Members of the European Parliament to have their communications with constituents and whistleblowers etc. protected.
The 3 MPs from Northern Ireland pointed out what even Theresa May admitted was a "conundrum" - it is unclear with the shifting changes made in secret to the Intelligence Agencies Guidance, did the Wilson Doctrine apply or not apply to those "double dipping" Members of Parliament MPs who were also simultaneously Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) ?
Caroline Lucas of course was a party to the the Investigatory Powers Tribunal case and mentioned the point Spy Blog noticed that even though the Wilson Doctrine has no legal power, neither do the Draft Code of Practice (not yet presented to, let alone approved by Parliament) nor the internal Intelligence Agency Guidance.
The lack of interest in their constituents' privacy and liberties shown by the absent MPs does not bode well for the forthcoming Draft Investigatory Powers Bill.
Spy Blog has always assumed that the deliberate vagueness and extreme brevity of any official Answers to Parliamentary Questions about the Wilson Doctrine, even as it has changed slightly over the years, meant that the public and Parliamentarians were being lied to by Downing Street regarding the confidentiality of the communications between Members of Parliament and their Constituents.
http://www.ipt-uk.com/section.aspx?pageid=8
14/10/2015IPT/14/79/CH IPT/14/80/CH IPT/14/172/CH
Caroline Lucas MP, Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb AM, George Galloway vs. the Security Service, SIS, GCHQ
The Tribunal heard and resolved issues relating to the status, meaning and effect of what has been called the Harold Wilson Doctrine, or the Wilson Doctrine, originating in the statement in the
House of Commons on 17 November 1966 by the Rt Hon Harold Wilson, the then Prime Minister. The Tribunal made declarations that the Wilson Doctrine applies only to targeted, and not
incidental, interception of Parliamentary communications, but that it has no legal effect, save that in practice the Security and Intelligence Agencies must comply with their own Guidance,
which has now been disclosed in the Judgment.
Full judgment (.pdf 25 pages) http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/Caroline_Lucas_JUDGMENT.pdf
10. There are relevant passages in the Codes, to which we are satisfied the Home Secretary was referring: the Interception of Communications Code of Practice pursuant to Section 71 of RIPA in force until this year ("the Code") does not make express reference to communications between parliamentarians and their constituents as being confidential, in that such communications are not listed among the examples given, but they are particularised in the new draft Code which has been de facto in operation since the beginning of this year, and complied with by the Security and Intelligence Agencies, although it has been the subject of consultation and has not yet been put before or approved by Parliament ("the Draft Code").
How can this possibly be compliant with Human Rights Act 1998 ECHR Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life "in accordance with law", when the supposed protections are still only a Draft Code of Practice which has not been approved by Parliament or are internal Intelligence Agency Guidance, which has no legal force at all ?
[...]
Liberty/Privacy provides, particularly having regard to the well-established proposition as to the reduced foreseeability required in the field of national security, a sufficient and adequate system for ECHR purposes, and one which does not require the Wilson Doctrine to underlie it. Unlike journalists' and lawyers' communications, there is no ECHR authority for enhanced protection for parliamentarians. There are very good reasons, as Sir Swinton Thomas pointed out, for parliamentarians not being treated differently from other citizens. The s.5 RIPA criteria and the approved interception regimes, including other statutory provisions for the respective Agencies, impose and signal a high threshold for interception. It is not necessary for this Tribunal to make new law. Moreover any attempt to do so would entail inventing a new code to define the types of communications covered and where lines are to be drawn. The Wilson Doctrine, as now enunciated and put into effect, highlights a need for caution and circumspection in respect of parliamentarians' communications. But such caution and circumspection will be called for in respect of many other types of confidential and sensitive private communications, which come to be considered under the interception regimes.
Answers to the preliminary issues
33. The Tribunal accordingly answers the preliminary issues attached to this judgment as follows:
i) The Wilson Doctrine does not apply to s.8(4) warrants at the stage of issue.ii) It applies to targeted, but not incidental, interception of parliamentarians' communications both in respect of s.8(1) warrants at date of issue and in respect of s.8(4) warrants at the date of accessing/selecting such communications.
iii) The Wilson Doctrine does not operate so as to create a substantive legitimate expectation.
iv) The Wilson Doctrine has no legal effect, but in practice the Agencies must comply with the Draft Code and with their own Guidance.
v) The regime for the interception of parliamentarians' communications is in accordance with the law under Article 8(2) and prescribed by law under Article 10(2), in particular by reference to s.5(3) of RIPA.
34. MPs' communications with their constituents and others are protected, like those of every other person, by the statutory regime established by Part 1 of RIPA 2000. The critical control is the requirement for a Secretary of State's warrant, which can only be issued if the requirements of Section 5 are satisfied. That regime is sufficient to protect such communications and nothing further is required by the ECHR.
It would be truer to say that
"MPs'communications with their constituents and others are unprotected, like those of every other person"
and
"That regime is insufficient to protect such communications"
There is a 3 hour Emergency Debate in the House of Commons on the Wilson Doctrine from some time after 14:30, tomorrow Monday 19th October 2015.
Will Her Majesty's Opposition hold the Government to account over this shoddy deception ? Or will the Corbynistas be overshadowed by the Scottish Nationalists ? Will the handful of Conservative MPs who seem to care about liberty and privacy and freedom have any effect on the Government ?
At a guess the Government will pretend that the the still only Draft Code of Practice is somehow important, even though it is the "incidental interception" on a massive industrial scale by GCHQ and our 5 Eyes intelligence foreign agency partners which is the threat to the privacy of a Constituent's emails or mobile phone or landline phone or postal communications with their Member of Parliament.
How can an MP be trusted with any sensitive personal or legal or whistleblower information, from their Constituents, especially if it pertains to a complaint against or wrongdoing by a branch of the UK Government, when there is no legal protection for such communications at all ?
The Open Rights Group has offered to help to train Members of Parliament (and other UK elected representatives not covered by the Wilson Doctrine in the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, Northern Ireland Assembly and the European Parliament) in the sort of secure digital communications techniques involving risk assessment, personal computers and smartphones etc. which journalists and political activists have had to resort to
These same techniques can be used to help to hide MPs' shady private and business lives, but that is a price worth paying for access to our democratically elected representatives, without UK or other Government snooping.
Spy Blog has some experience with organising and teaching at CryptoParty events in London and even started to organise one for MPs, Peers or their staff in the last Parliament, until it became obvious that MPs didn't care about such things, by rushing the badly scrutinised Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act through in an unnecessary hurry.
Perhaps there will be more interest in such techniques by our elected representatives after this Wilson Doctrine debacle.
Unless and until Members of Parliament who criticise the Government over the Wilson Doctrine start to do things like using and publishing a PGP / GPG Public Encryption Key for their Constituency or Campaign business, nothing will change, and the public will become even more alienated from untrustworthy politicians and bureaucrats.