We suspected that the "security screen" which now separates some of the visitors who watch the Members of Parliament and Ministers in the Chamber of the House of Commons, was an utter waste of public money.
It seems that we were correct.
Yesterday's "protest" incident, which covered the Prime Minister and others with a supposedly benign purple dyed powder during Prime Minister's Questions, showed just how much of a Maginot Line this supposed "defence" actually is.
Even worse, the behavior of the MPs under the direction of the Speaker showed that they had not actually been listening to any of the security advice that led to the installation of the controversial screen in the first place.
If this screen was meant to protect against the "real threat" or possability of chemical or biological weapons attack by fanatics, then their action of clearing the Chamber and bumbling about the rest of the Palace of Westminster was entirely the wrong thing to do.
If they had been exposed to say anthrax etc. then their action put other people in the building, and members of the public at risk, by spreading the chemical or biological agent far and wide.
What they should have done was to seal off the Chamber, then wait for the analysis of the powder, and wait to to be decontaminated and sent for individual medical checks, if necessary.
The best defence of Parliament should be to make it absolutely clear that even if terrorists or others succeed in assassinating all our leading politicians, they will not have won. We will mourn the loss of the individual people involved, but we will democratically elect replacements.
The previous headline security breach, where protestors climbed up St Stephen's clock tower which houses the Big Ben bell, highlighted the fact there seem to be around 12,000 people who have been issued with photo ID passes to the Palace of Westminster and to Portcullis House next door (the buildings are connected by a tunnel).
Despite a rudimentary airport style metal detector and bag X-ray security check for visitors, it would seem that many of these pass holders evade such checks.
Even worse, we have witnessed the common practice of a pass holder opening the security door from the inside, and escorting up to 3 visitors around the buildings.
These visitors do not even have to sign in and sign out of the building, or wear Temporary Vistor Badges, as is common in many private sector and government offices, and which is part of the now public advice given by the new MI5 Security Service website.
This pass system, despite the armed police guards, does not even meet the basic fire safety criterion of showing exactly how many people are in the building at any one time, and therefore how many may still be trapped inside during a fire alarm or bomb alert, when the building is evacuated.
Changing the passes themselves to be more "high tech" like the proposed Compulsory Biometric ID Cards, would not make any difference to the security of the building at all, if these existing lax practices continue.